It is becoming harder and harder to know what you can believe on the news. Advances in information technology and the explosion of social media postings have created a news environment that is exceptionally easy to exploit for both profit and political advantage. The best way to protect yourself is to adopt this three-stage approach:

Identify. The best question to ask yourself when reading a news story is “Is this report too good to be true?” Stories emanating from a less practiced deceiver almost always fall into this category. Other Deception Detection questions to ask when dealing with a more sophisticated deceiver are:

• Was the information received at a critical point in my decision making process?
• Would accepting the information cause me to extend or divert significant resources?
• Does believing the information require me to alter a key assumption or change a judgment?
• Would the originator have a lot to win or lose should I decide the report is true?
• Does the deceiver have a feedback channel that would illuminate how successful the deception was?
• Does the information conflict with other reporting on the topic?
• Does this source have a history of generating questionable or biased reports?

Categorize. Fake news comes in many flavors.  If you want to distinguish fake news from real news reporting, a good question to ask is “What is motivating the author?” The identity of the author usually is a good indication of how much you need to worry:

• Fake News is usually generated by individual entrepreneurs to mislead a reader for personal or financial gain; the purpose is to attract the viewer to ads thereby generating revenue for the originator of the story.
• False or Fraud News is purposely intended to mislead the reader, most often for partisan political purposes. The objective is to provide incorrect information that confirms the readers’ biases and further hardens mental mindsets.
• Deception is the intentional action by an adversary to influence the perceptions, decisions, or actions of the recipient to the advantage of the deceiver. The better the deception the less likely you are to detect it.
• Active Measures are Russian deception operations intended to manipulate the perceptions or actions of individual decision makers, the public, and governments to influence the course of world events. RT (Russia Today) is a global news network based in Moscow which is a good example of this type reporting.

Avoid. What can you do to avoid being deceived?  Here are some Deception Detection steps you can take:

• Avoid relying on only one source of information or stream of reporting.
• Seek reporting from those closest to the event.
• Do not rely exclusively on what someone says (verbal intelligence). Look for material evidence that would back up the report.
• Consider a full set of hypotheses that could explain what is occurring.
• Look for a pattern where a source’s reporting initially appears to be plausible but consistently turns out later on to be wrong.

The chances of being deceived by fake news are growing every day. Facebook, Google, and other social media sites are busy developing ways to screen out fake news, but the task is daunting. Until such algorithms are perfected, the best strategy is to stop and ask yourself the questions listed above before retweeting or forwarding a “really great story” to a friend or colleague.

For a fuller description of Deception Detection, order your copy of Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, 2nd ed. here.

The just-published Guide is written for analysts and managers in the government and the private sector who want to enhance their interpersonal communications and briefing skills. Policymakers and business executives are showing a growing preference for oral presentations and digital displays on tablets. The Guide takes a practical and experience-based approach to teaching briefing skills. Key features include the Effective Briefer’s Checklist, the four traits of a successful briefer, how to brief officials with fixed mindsets, and tips for communicating over the Internet.

Much has been asserted—and little yet proven—about alleged Russian efforts to develop both witting and unwitting agents of influence and collaboration in the United States. If you were Russia, what strategies would you employ? How would you evaluate your prospects for success? Try using Red Hat Analysis to answer these questions. This technique consists of putting yourself in adversaries’ shoes and asking how they would behave.

As an adversary, your first step is to learn everything you can about your targets and their business. This can most easily be done when they travel to your country. Any government official traveling to Russia, Cuba, or North Korea has been warned that their movements and hotel room will be under watch. My wife and I have observed this surveillance first-hand; she during her many trips to Moscow and me in my travels to Cuba—including a surprise visitor to my room by a Cuban intelligence agent. I awoke at 2:00 a.m. to find a man going through my open suitcase next to my bed; he smiled at me and then exited the room. Castro had communicated his message effectively. (Note to readers: For these reasons, always travel with a “clean computer” and store your information on a removable thumb drive that never leaves your possession. Assume people will access your room—and can access a hotel safe as well.)

The second tried-and-true strategy is to find a way to compromise your target so that he or she can be subtly cajoled—or even blackmailed—into cooperating with you. This can take the form of asking targets to write a paper to make you smarter about their subject, to set up an “exchange of information” as part of a mutually beneficial partnering relationship, or getting them to engage in illicit acts that are videotaped.

If you approach this from the perspective of Red Hat Analysis, you quickly learn that the process of making someone an unwitting or witting collaborator involves a lot more than just offering them money. Richards J. Heuer, Jr. notes in an unclassified study he undertook for the Defense Department some years ago that most people who provide information to a foreign power appreciate monetary rewards, but their driving motive usually is different. His research shows that espionage is also a means to satisfy compelling emotional needs; many are drawn to it as an expression of power to influence events, an outlet for anger, a means of revenge, or a source of excitement.

Heuer documents that people who become agents of a foreign power usually have more pressing emotional than financial needs. History has shown that if you are using Red Hat Analysis to think like an adversary, you would want to recruit people who possess many of the following character weaknesses:

• Anti-social behavior. Lack of respect for commonly accepted rules of society.
• Impulsiveness/immaturity. Actions are motivated by quick, easy gratification of desires and failure to consider the consequences of one’s actions.
• Narcissism. The tendency to view the world only from the perspective of how it affects them, with related traits of grandiosity, a sense of entitlement, and a lack of empathy.
• Inability to make and keep a commitment. The inability to form enduring emotional commitments.
• Paranoia. A pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of other people; can easily come to view his employer or the US Government as the enemy.
• Vindictiveness. Someone who seeks revenge for real or imagined wrongs; a trait found in narcissists whose self-esteem is based on a grossly inflated opinion of their own abilities.
• Risk seeking. Impulsive or irresponsible behavior that leads someone to gloss over risks or think they do not apply to them because they are so clever or talented.

For a fuller description of Red Hat Analysis, order your copy of Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, 2nd ed. To learn more about how adversaries target people for recruitment, click here to access the DoD Adjudicative Desk Reference, 2014.

2016 was a year of surprises for many of us, including the Brexit vote, election of Donald Trump as US President, the impact of Fake News, and a barrage of terrorist attacks. In the wake of these events, we can’t help but wonder what the coming year will bring.

What do you THINK will happen? Will your hopes be realized or your fears be confirmed? When you make New Year’s resolutions, you write them down so you can remember exactly what you thought on January 1. Let’s see how accurate your predictions are by writing down this week what you expect the next six months will bring, and then track what actually happens.

Baseline your expectations by making a list of things (observable events or Indicators) that you believe are likely to happen over the next six months. For example:

• The interest rates will rise by 1 percent by 30 April.
• All of President Trump’s Cabinet appointments will be confirmed.
• Two senior Trump appointments will leave office in three months.
• Marie Le Pen will win the first round of the 2017 French presidential election on 23 April but lose the run-off election on 7 May.

Make a list of five Indicators with five positive outcomes (what you hope will happen) in the next six months. Next, make a list of five Indicators(observable events) with five negative outcomes (what you are afraid will happen). At the beginning of every month, go back and see which indicators came true and which did not. If most or all of your Indicators came true, more people should be listening to you. If you were wrong, then go back and challenge some of the key assumptions you are making today.

Make your lists this week—it will only take a few minutes. Review them on 1 February; are they still valid?  Review them again on 1 March and on 1 April, etc. Compare your projections to what actually is happening. I can guarantee that several months from now you will be surprised by what you wrote down in early January!

To learn more about how to use Indicators, check out our classes or order your copy of Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, 2nd ed.

New Year’s Resolution: sharpen your analytic skills in 2017!

Globalytica is launching its new analytic training program with the two-week online course: Critical Thinking Fundamentals from February 7-21. This course introduces learners to the most common cognitive biases and intuitive traps, various critical thinking processes and structured analytic techniques, and how to use these techniques in the production process. 25% off registration with code: New25Insider

Click here for details.

Globalytica wishes our worldwide network of clients and partners a very Happy New Year! To date, nearly 30 government organizations and universities, a dozen Fortune 100 companies, and several global banks have tapped our expertise in building analytic cultures. In 2016, Globalytica conducted Strategic Foresight Analysis workshops around the globe. We have taught courses in universities in the US, Spain, Germany, Denmark and the UK. Our book sales continue to grow; we reached 22 countries last year, including Greenland, Singapore, Brazil, Austria, Haiti and New Zealand. Globalytica looks forward to expanding our outreach even more in 2017.

The primary task of an analyst is to help policymakers and other decision makers make good decisions based on the best available information and most compelling logic. This task becomes much more challenging, however, when the recipient of the analysis bases his or her decisions on pre-established, firmly held, and often immutable precepts or world views. Such individuals are usually more interested in imposing their view on the world—or on the environment in which they operate—rather than trying to better understand it. They see data as useful ammunition they can cite to demonstrate the correctness of their approach or predispositions. Information that contradicts their view is usually quickly dismissed or simply ignored.

When asked to provide analytic support to such individuals, many of whom could be described as ideologues, what is an analyst to do? When dealing with individuals with strongly held views or even “the answer,” successful analysts take the time to develop multiple strategies for communicating their analytic message.

1. When an official asks for specific information or intelligence to justify his or her position, frame the request in a broader context, providing the recipient with the data directly relevant to the request as well as any associated information and analysis that is contradictory. In essence, the task is to tee up both the pros and the cons in a comprehensive framework and then allow the decisionmaker to act based on a fully informed set of facts and analysis.
2. Take the initiative to generate “stand-back” strategic looks at a situation, identifying key drivers and establishing an overarching framework for understanding the dynamics at play. Once such a framework is established, the tactical disagreements over how to interpret specific items of information become far easier to resolve.
3. Rely more heavily on structured analytic techniques—such as Indicators, Argument Mapping, Deception Detection, Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, and Premortem Analysis—that can be used to demonstrate in a compelling way why the official’s analysis is flawed.

An analyst should never refrain from providing hard-hitting, objective, and well-supported analysis, even when the message is likely to be poorly received. Engaging a decision maker with an entrenched world view in a policy debate, however, is both inappropriate and almost always counterproductive. Often such conversations only make the client more obdurate and less likely to seek analytic support.

One of the worst mistakes an analyst can make is to self-censor. Self-censorship can take two forms. First is tweaking the analysis to make it more acceptable to the client in the hope of retaining access and sustaining a dialogue. Second, and more pernicious, is not sending the analysis to the client—or even not doing the analysis at all—because you believe it will be ignored or dismissed. Analysts should never discount the possibility that a combination of hard facts and sharply drawn analysis that competes with a decision maker’s views may over time allow the policymaker to “discover” on his or her own the merit of a contrary view.

To read more about the techniques described above, order your copy of Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis (2nd Ed.) here.

Introduction to Intelligence Analysis 101

With the surprising result of the US Presidential election, a fundamental question is whether the American system of governance will undergo a major transformation. One tried-and-true technique for addressing such a question is Strategic Foresight Analysis. This article applies the Alternative Futures method to identify major drivers—forces, factors, or trends that will determine how the system will evolve—and pair these drivers to generate alternative scenarios of how the future will evolve. In this case, two key drivers are identified and displayed on a 2-by-2 matrix. For each quadrant of the matrix, a unique trajectory can be identified defined by the two ends of each spectrum.
When analyzing the current US political landscape, several drivers appear to have played a major role in the presidential campaign:

• Increased popular anxiety over social change, the pace of globalization, and introduction of new technologies
• Decreased trust in institutions and news reporting
• Heightened focus on personalities rather than issues
• The impact of big money in the wake of the US Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling
• The diminished influence of political parties
• The growing influence of social media as a political mobilization tool

These forces and factors can be represented in large part by two independent spectrums:

• Who is best positioned to leverage political capital?  Institutions (to include political parties and Congress) or personalities (to include rich candidates and major donors)?
• How will decisions be made and future conflicts be resolved? Through democratic processes or by more authoritarian means?

Arraying these spectrums on an X and a Y axis (see graphic below) enables the generation of four mutually exclusive stories or scenarios represented in each quadrant of the matrix. Each scenario represents a mind-stretching but plausible potential trajectory representing how the US political system of governance could change radically in the next ten or more years.

Established Multi-Party System:  Over the next decade or so, the Republican Party could fracture into two or three parties, the Democratic Party could split into two parties, and new political movements could emerge. Because political parties are not mentioned in the US Constitution, a move from a two-party to a multi-party system would not require a Constitutional Amendment. The Electoral College, however, will certainly come under increased scrutiny now that two Presidential candidates—Al Gore and Hillary Clinton—have won the popular vote but were denied the Presidency in the Electoral College balloting. If multiple national parties emerged, each would have to develop independent political machines and sources of funding, and many longstanding administrative procedures for conducting elections at the state level would be revised. Pressure could also emerge to move to a parliamentary system of governance.

One Party Rule.  If only one of the two dominant parties fractures, the dominant party would increasingly win elections against a fragmented opposition. Over time, it would gain unchallenged control over most political processes and budgets. Mexico offers a good historical example of this when the PRI used to dominate the state. As this scenario develops, the ruling party would become more and more susceptible to corruption, but the populace might prefer a more autocratic—yet still “democratically” based—approach to today’s increasingly dysfunctional two-party system.

Fascism. Growing levels of social discomfort and increasing political polarization accompanied by outbreaks of anti-administration violence could open the door for the emergence of a “political savior” to impose stability on the system. Such a candidate would tap nativist sentiments, offer simple solutions, undermine or even subvert existing institutions, and create new vehicles for promoting a cult of personality.

Celebrity Democracy.  As the influence of political parties wanes, candidates for political office would increasingly be drawn from the ranks of millionaires, celebrities, or charismatic individuals supported by extremely rich donors. Political campaigns would reflect increasingly sophisticated advertising techniques. Democratic processes would be retained, but political parties would no longer orchestrate who runs for high elective office. Success would be measured mostly by a candidate’s “popularity” as reflected in polling before the election and his or her approval rating after the election.

A simple analysis of the matrix reveals that the more the key forces and factors of change drive US politics to the top-right corner of the matrix (and away from the bottom-left corner) the healthier the political system. The other two quadrants represent less optimal alternative paths that may not have been previously considered but merit serious exploration. They could be seen as either temporary way stations in a move toward a multi-party system or as stepping stones to an authoritarian or even fascist system of governance.

Do you have trouble admitting you are wrong? Or convincing a colleague that his or her analysis is incorrect? Most of us find these tasks challenging because our egos are involved and we usually focus our attention on information that supports our view. This issue of Analytic Insider presents Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, the fourth and last of a select group of structured analytic techniques—including Indicators, Argument Mapping, and Deception Detection—that can spur analysts to admit their initial analysis was flawed and to work toward achieving a better result.

Technique #4: Analysis of Competing Hypotheses

As political campaigns heat up in advance of the US national elections in November, the airwaves are filled with competing interpretations of past events. Our natural tendency is to contrast all the facts and explanations one candidate posits to prove she or he is right with the other candidate’s list and agree with whomever has made the stronger case. A more thorough and efficient approach is to focus instead on how many facts or explanations are inconsistent with a candidate’s position. Sometimes only one highly persuasive item of inconsistent information is sufficient to reject an entire line of analysis. When an analyst is confronted with an item of information or piece of evidence that could not be true if his or her stated position is correct, most analysts –but probably not most politicians—will agree that the initial analysis is flawed and a new hypothesis is needed. More often than not, however, the contrasting information is less compelling. In such cases, it is more efficient to focus on what is inconsistent with a given hypothesis and embrace the position supported by the least inconsistent data.

The good news is that technology is making it easier to identify compelling contrary information. Mobile phone pictures, videos, and audio tapes, for example, can provide incontrovertible evidence of what was said or done. The key to being a successful analyst is to consciously seek out and record inconsistent or anomalous data and to consider more than one explanation as potentially true until all the data and facts are on the table.

To learn more about how the eight­step Analysis of Competing Hypotheses methodology works, check out the Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques. For a fuller discussion of when to use the technique, its value added, and potential pitfalls to avoid see Chapter 7 in Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis.

Do you have trouble admitting when you are wrong? Most of us do because it is hard to admit we have made a mistake. We have a natural tendency to accept information we read or hear as correct, assuming it comes from an authoritative source. We are particularly prone to accept information when what we hear is consistent with our world view. Those who want to manipulate how we think, however, understand this concept. They will supply deceptive information in the hope of changing our behavior. This issue of The Analytic Insider presents Detecting Deception, the third of a select group of analytic techniques, including Indicators and Argument Mapping, that can spur analysts to admit they are wrong when they incorrectly believed that what they first heard was true.

Technique #3: Detecting Deception Who hacked the Democratic National Committee server? Was it a member of

Who hacked the Democratic National Committee server? Was it a member of rival political organization? Rogue hackers in Berlin? Russia? China? Hackers employed by WikiLeaks? Ukrainian cyber hackers? Are these real messages? Why did this information surface only days before the Democratic National Convention? When might more hacked messages appear in the media?

If a deception campaign is underway, how would you know who was doing it? How strong is the case that Russia is behind it and not just some rogue hackers? In the Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques, we offer the following signs that address these questions; they will help you assess whether someone was conducting a deception campaign.

Baseline conditions

Does the potential deceiver have:

1. A history of conducting deception campaigns? (Russia is one of the most notorious users of deception.)
2. A feedback channel that would allow it to track how the information is being processed and to what effect? (This has become a major consequence of the 24/7 media environment.)
3. A great deal to lose or gain depending on the outcome? (Such as the integrity of democratic institutions and the US electoral process.)

Tactical tipoffs

Did key information enter the public domain:

1. At a critical time? (For example, just before a national convention or just before it is time to vote.)
2. From a source whose bona fides are questionable? (WikiLeaks.)
3. From a single source or based on a few attention­grabbing documents?

Would accepting the information as true prompt you to:

1. Alter a key assumption—something you previously had considered common wisdom?
2. Reallocate substantial resources or reposition substantial personnel?

On 6 September, The Washington Post reported that senior US intelligence officials have recently concluded that Russia may well be engaging in a covert operation during the US presidential race to sow public distrust of US political institutions and disrupt its electoral process. (Read the article here.) A lead indicator that Russia may have launched such a campaign was the hacking and release of Democratic National Committee emails just days before the Democratic Party Convention—some of which had been doctored. Officials speculate that several motives are possible, including the desire to 1) influence US elections and 2) generate propaganda fodder to counter US democracy building initiatives around the world, particularly in the countries of the former Soviet Union.

To learn more about how to evaluate whether a report is deceptive, employ the Deception Detection Checklist (included in the Handbook of Analytic Tools & Techniques) that consists of 18 questions focusing on:

• MOM ­ Motive, Opportunity, and Means
• POP – Past Opposition Practices
• MOSES – Manipulability Of SourcES
• EVE – EValuation of Evidence

Remember, just becoming sensitive to the possibility of deception usually will not protect you from being deceived. It is simply too hard cognitively to challenge every item of information you read or hear. A better strategy is to train yourself to recognize when you are most susceptible to deception. When one of these flags goes up, pause to ask yourself “Am I being deceived?”

Do you have trouble admitting when you’re wrong?

Most of us do because it is hard to admit we have made a mistake. Once we have come to a conclusion (like which political candidate to support), we tend to accept data that supports our view and ignore data that would undercut that decision. We fall into the traps of Confirmation Bias, Ignoring Inconsistent Evidence, Relying on First Impressions, and the Anchoring Effect. Structured Analytic Techniques (SATs) are designed to save us from these pitfalls. This issue of the Analytic Insider presents Argument Mapping, the second of a select group of analytic techniques, including Indicators and Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, that can spur analysts to admit they were mistaken in their initial analysis.

Technique #2: Argument Maps

Argument Maps are used to test a single hypothesis through logical reasoning. An Argument Map is a tree diagram that starts out with a lead hypothesis or conclusion and then branches out to show the logic, evidence, and assumptions that support or undermine that hypothesis or conclusion. An Argument Map makes it easy for analysts and, more importantly, decision makers to clarify and organize their thoughts. With the entire map arrayed in front of them, they can more easily and accurately evaluate the soundness of the analysis and their resulting decisions.

Imagine if you are engaged in a discussion of whether Brexit makes sense or Obamacare is worthwhile. Those on each side of the issue will marshal piles of evidence and logic to support their view, leaving it to you to decide who has made the stronger case. Each side will emphasize what best supports their view and ignore facts or logic that argue against their position. When the issues are this complex, it becomes very hard to figure out what makes the most sense. This is an ideal setting where a structured technique can help you sort through the thinking process.

An Argument Map forces both sides to put everything on the “same table” in an organized fashion. Each side lists the arguments (or claims) and evidence that support the hypothesis, the claims and evidence that undermines it, rebuttals for all claims, and assumptions inherent in the argument. With all this information arrayed in the context of a single diagram, both sides can then stand back and evaluate all aspects of the issue. Once all the evidence is arrayed, evaluated, and prioritized, the map will show whether the conclusion is fundamentally supported by the evidence, logic, and assumptions or if it falls apart.

The construction of an Argument Map makes it much harder for advocates to focus attention only on arguments that best support their position. All evidence must be evaluated within the context of the entire argument. If one side does not agree with the conclusion, they are free to add new data or new logic at the appropriate location in the map or alter initial assumptions.

When a team of analysts constructs an Argument Map, a picture will emerge showing the overall strength or weakness of the initial hypothesis. If the analysts agree to approach the topic with an open mind, a consensus will usually form within the team over what is the proper analytic bottom line. In most cases, analysts will freely admit that some initial positions they took were wrong because the technique forced them to 1) consider new evidence, 2) weigh the significance of all the evidence, 3) discover possible faults in their logic, or 4) recognize that some of their initial assumptions were flawed.

Globalytica’s case study, Iraq WMD: Facts, Fiction, and Yellowcake, uses an Argument Map to show how each argument that supported the conclusion that Iraq had imported yellowcake from Niger can be refuted. Click here to purchase the case study today.

Argument Map:

Is Iraq importing yellowcake from Niger for its nuclear weapons program?

Congratulations to Mary O’Sullivan on being named 2016 Instructor of the Year by the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE). Mary has been an integral part of the Pherson Associates team since 2008, developing and instructing classes that have reached thousands of analysts and students in the intelligence community and beyond.

Mary’s notable achievements include:

• Leading design and management of analytic training programs for government audiences as Dean of Pherson Associates’ educational facility, The Forum.
• Developing and managing Globalytica’s certificate courses, offered internationally and to private industry.
• Teaches on average more than 50 courses per year to government and private sector analysts.
• Published contributions: development of the CREATE methodology as well as a chapter in Intelligence Communication in the Digital Era (see below for details).
• Established credentials as a gifted instructor, innovator, and mentor. Chancellor and co-founder of CIA University.

We are proud to have Mary O’Sullivan on our team as she continues to make strides in strengthening the analytic workforce. We are honored that Mary’s instructional excellence and innovative curriculum development have been recognized by IAFIE.

Intelligence Communication in the Digital Era Transforming Security, Defence and Business

By Rubén Arcos and Randolph H. Pherson (Editors)

• Present analysis and customize information to decision makers.
• Leverage advancements in technology to communicate information differently.
• Encourage analysts to change the way they work, and provide them with the resources and production technology to do so.
• Invest in new analytic tradecraft that prioritizes developing producer/consumer relations rather than predicting future events.

FIND OUT MORE

Do you have trouble admitting when you’re wrong?

Most of us do – and one reason for this reticence is being slow to acknowledge the possibility that we have made a mistake. Let’s face it- the only thing worse than being wrong is taking too long to realize it! Mistakes are inevitable, but we have the tools to help you avoid looking like a fool who can’t admit a blunder. Over the next few months, the Analytic Insider will explore a small group of Structured Analytic Techniques that can spur an analyst to admit that his or her analysis is wrong.

Technique #1: Indicators

When an analyst generates a scenario or makes a prediction that a certain event is likely to play out, a best practice is to develop a list of indicators or “things one would see” that suggest the scenario is actually emerging. A good analyst will also develop a set of observables that will indicate the scenario or event is not going to happen. If most of the indicators that the scenario will play out start to happen, then the analyst will be vindicated in her or his prediction and congratulated for outstanding insight. If, on the other hand, few or none of the indicators come into play and even some of the negative indicators start to “light up,” then the analyst has little choice but to admit that the analysis is flawed or undermined by unanticipated intervening events.

If the analyst has not developed a set of indicators to provide an objective baseline for the analysis, he or she most likely will be inclined to stick to the analysis as long as possible, focusing on the data points that confirm the proffered view and ignoring the mounting pile of evidence that contradicts the prediction.

The existence of a pre-determined set of baseline indicators, however, quickly illuminates this mistake. If “we all agreed we would be wrong if these things happen” and they start to happen, only a fool would refuse to admit that the initial analysis is wrong.

In today’s uncertain and increasingly confusing world, analysts (as well as political pundits) should develop lists of indicators to accompany their projections and predictions. At the Dahrendorf Symposium in Berlin last June, we developed five sets of scenarios and associated indicators for how EU relations would evolve with the United States, China, Ukraine, Turkey, and the Middle East (link to the report in Recommended Resources above). The next step will be to track the indicators to see which events are actually occurring, indicating which scenarios are the most apt forecasts for the EU’s future.

Indicators are a pre-established list of observable events that analysts periodically review to track events, spot emerging trends, and warn of unanticipated change.

Indicators can be grouped into two categories:

• Validating or backward-looking: Past or current actions or activities that would help confirm that a target’s activities or behavior are consistent with an established pattern or historical norm. Characteristics that would help an analyst determine whether something meets a set criteria.
• Anticipating or forward-looking: Future activities that one would expect to observe if a given hypothesis is correct or a predicted scenario is emerging. Developments that allow analysts to track how a situation is playing out over time.

The method for developing validating indicators is fairly straightforward. The first two steps usually are done working alone. The third and fourth steps can be an individual or a group process.

• Precisely define the phenomenon being considered.
• Locate an existing list of indicators that best describe this phenomenon (or develop your own based on historical research).
• Assess how many of the historically-derived indicators are present in the case.
• Assess whether the correlation is strong enough (enough indicators are present) to justify applying that label to the current case.

The method for developing anticipating indicators of change is somewhat more involved. The process can be done working alone or in a group:

• Identify a set of alternative scenarios or competing hypotheses.
• Generate a list of activities, statements, or events that one would expect to observe if the scenario is beginning to emerge or the hypothesis is coming true.
• Examine the list to ensure that all the indicators are:
  • Observable and collectible. Can it be observed and reported by a reliable source and reliably collected over time?
  • Valid. Is it clearly relevant to the end state the analyst is trying to predict or assess? Does it accurately measure the concept or phenomenon at issue?
  • Reliable. Is data collection consistent when comparable methods are used? Those observing and collecting data must observe the same things. Reliability requires precise definition of the indicators.
  • Stable. Is it useful and consistent over time to allow comparisons and track events?
  • Unique. Does it measure only one thing and, in combination with other indicators, point only to the phenomenon being studied?
• Periodically check the indicators list to track which scenario appears to be emerging or which hypothesis appears to be most correct.